Posted on March 13, 2025
Delaying the . . . Evitable? Tenth Circuit Invalidates District Court’s Revocation of a Statutory-Maximum, Expired Sentence for Supervised Release Because of Six-Month Delay
United States v. Gulley, No. 24-3078, 2025 WL 747686 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025)
Author: Lane Barrette, Staff Editor
Issue: Is 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) a jurisdictional provision? If so, is it “reasonably necessary” to enforce conditions of an expired term of supervision during a six-month delay between expiration and revocation?
Answer: Yes. And no, the six-month delay was not “reasonably necessary” to confer the district court with jurisdiction to revoke the supervised release under § 3583(i).
Facts: Tegan Gulley served a three-year term of supervised release—the statutory-maximum sentence. Five days before this term expired, Gulley’s probation officer petitioned to revoke Gulley’s supervision. On the same day, the district court scheduled a revocation hearing for one month after the term expired. At the revocation hearing, the court granted Gulley’s request for a continuance, delaying its disposition on revocation for six months. During these six months, Gulley remained on the expired terms of supervision. At the continued revocation hearing, the district court revoked Gulley’s supervision and imposed a 15-month custodial sentence.
Discussion: A statute is jurisdictional if “it governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity.”[1] Statutes that directly address a court’s “statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case must of course be treated as jurisdictional.”[2] Under § 3583(i), “the power of a court to revoke” an expired term of supervision only exists if the delay between expiration and revocation is “reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration.” By conditioning a court’s power to adjudicate revocations, § 3583(i) is a jurisdictional statute.[3]
Whether delays are “reasonably necessary” depends on the “legitimate interests” of both parties before the court.[4] Although Gulley requested the continuance, the district court made a mistake of law when it “unlawfully” extended the expired term of supervision. Because Gulley’s original supervised release was for the “maximum authorized term,” the court violated § 3583(e)(2) by enforcing the same conditions of the expired term throughout the continuance period. Such unlawful acts are not, as a matter of law, “reasonable” under § 3583(i). Therefore, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to impose the revocation judgment.
Key Authorities: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (governing revocation “beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release”); § 3583(e)(2) (permitting courts to extend a supervised term only “if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed”).
[1] Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011).
[2] United States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110, 1122 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1146 (10th Cir. 2015)) (internal quotations omitted).
[3] See Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1027 (10th Cir. 2013).
[4] United States v. Morales-Isabarras, 745 F.3d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2005)).
