Passcodes and the Fifth Amendment: When Must Police Re-Mirandize? Kansas Weighs In

State v. Harris, No. 125,936, (Kan. 2025).

Staff Editor Trey Bohlender

February 22, 2026

Issue: Whether detectives violated Harris’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by compelling him to involuntarily disclose his cell phone passcodes.

Answer: No.  Because the Miranda warning that detectives had provided to Harris earlier was still valid, and detectives did not coerce Harris to turn over his cell phone passcodes.

Facts: On January 8th, 2018, police responded to Robert Harris’s residence regarding a disturbance.  Officers arrested Harris for an outstanding warrant and transported him to the station.  Harris was held overnight and interviewed for several hours.  Detectives read Harris the Miranda warning, and he said he understood his rights and agreed to answer questions.  Detectives interviewed Harris two times on the 8th and 9th.  Ultimately, Harris admitted to killing his wife and told detectives where to find her body.

Later, on the 9th, police obtained a warrant for two phones that were recovered from Harris during his arrest.  Police served Harris with the warrants and requested the passcodes.  Police had not re-Mirandized Harris before asking for the passcodes.  Harris asked if he needed an attorney, and police explained that the decision was up to him.  One detective then told Harris that they could obtain a court order to compel him to provide fingerprint access or the passcodes.  After this, Harris gave police his passcodes, and they obtained incriminating data from the phones, tying him to his wife’s murder.

Discussion: The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only applies when the accused is (1) compelled (2) to make a testimonial communication (3) that is incriminating.  First, the detectives’ failure to re-Mirandize Harris before asking for his passcodes did not create a presumption that he was compelled to involuntarily disclose them.  The Court applied a flexible totality of the circumstances analysis and held that because no intervening event affected Harris’s understanding of his rights, the 15-hour gap between Harris’s interrogations did not invalidate his initial Miranda warning.  Overall, Harris validly waived his rights because nothing indicated that he did not understand his rights when detectives requested his phone passcodes.

Second, the detectives’ statements about their ability to obtain an order to compel Harris to turn over his passcodes were not inherently coercive.  The detectives had obtained similar orders in the past; therefore, they had a reasonable basis to believe they could get an order to compel Harris to turn over his passcodes.  Finally, based on the totality of the circumstances, the detectives had not coerced Harris to turn over his passcodes involuntarily.  The interaction between detectives and Harris was short, Harris was not unduly restrained, the detectives were not aggressive with Harris, and Harris had no vulnerabilities that impacted the voluntariness of his password disclosure.

Key Authorities: 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (established the Miranda warning that detectives are required to provide to individuals before custodial interrogation and provided guidance for analyzing when someone’s statements are coerced by law enforcement or not).

State v. Mattox, 124 P.3d 6 (Kan. 2005) (holding that a renewed Miranda warning was not required after a valid waiver if the suspect remained in custody during the elapsed time, the subsequent interrogation took place within a reasonable time, and nothing occurred in the interim that would affect the suspect’s understanding of the original warning). 

State v. Brown, 783 P.2d 1278 (Kan. 1989) (holding that a consent to search was not coerced after the officer stated a search warrant could be obtained because evidence established there would have been probable cause to conduct the search).